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A. 
II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
The Claim that Counsel was Ineffective in Abandoning Self-Defense was 
Raised in the District Court 
Mr. Williams has argued that he was denied the state and federal constitutional rights to 
effective assistance of counsel when counsel rendered deficient performance in abandoning self-
defense. Appellant's Opening Brief at pages 
Constitution Amendments 6 and 14. 
citing Idaho Const. Art. 1, § 13; United States 
The state's first response to this argument is that this claim was not raised below. 
Respondent's Brief at page 9. However, the record demonstrates that the claim was raised below 
and summarily dismissed by the district court. 
In his prose petition, Mr. Williams claimed that counsel's failure to properly present his 
claims of self defense constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. R Vol. I, p. 33-34. In his 
affidavit in support of his response and objection to summary disposition requests by the state, 
Mr. Williams averred that he specifically instructed counsel that he believed his actions were 
taken in self-defense and he wished to pursue that defense at trial with complete acquittal as the 
goal. R Vol. II, p. 305. In his objection to the motion for summary disposition, he devoted five 
pages to arguing that counsel was ineffective in failing to present self defense (R Vol. II, p. 235-
240) and wrote that "defense counsel abandoned the defense of self-defense and dedicated 
herself solely to a verdict of not guilty of the first-degree murder charge, contrary to the known 
and stated wishes of the Petitioner." R Vol. II, p. 237. In his responsive brief, Mr. Williams 
wrote: 
... She abandoned the defense despite Petitioner's specific instruction and request 
that self-defense be presented and pursued. It was not. He wanted to be acquitted 
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on all charges, not just the first degree murder. The defense counsel's failure to 
address any of these issues cannot be attributed to trial strategy, as they did not 
address Defendant's chosen trial strategy .... 
. . . It can be seen in no other light that the defense was prejudiced as his defense 
was never presented. 
R Vol. II, p. 303. 
And, as quoted in both Mr. Williams' Opening Brief at page 10 and the state's brief at 
pages 8-9, the district court specifically found that Mr. Williams claimed he requested counsel to 
present a theory of self-defense and that she did not present this theory, but that this decision fell 
within the scope of tactical decisions. R Vol. II, p. 3 67. 
The claim that counsel was ineffective in failing to present self-defense was clearly raised 
and decided upon in the district court. 
The state appears to argue that the issue of whether summary dismissal was inappropriate 
because counsel's act of abandoning self-defense and thereby conceding guilt of voluntary 
manslaughter against the repeat and clear direction of Mr. Williams was constitutionally deficient 
performance subject to a presumption of prejudice was not raised in the district court because 
the word "concession" was not used. Respondent's Brief at page 9. However, Mr. Williams did 
assert in his petition that counsel's abandonment of self-defense was a concession of guilt and 
inherently prejudicial. In his petition, Mr. Williams cited United States v. Swanson, 943 F.2d 
1070 (9th Cir. 1996), and stated trial counsel abandoned the only defense which was "inherently 
prejudicial where counsel conceded [the J only factual issues" and therefore no showing of 
prejudice was necessary. R Vol. I, pages 27-28. 
The question of ineffective assistance of counsel in not presenting self-defense was raised 
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in the district court and may now be heard by this Court. 
If the state is arguing that the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was raised below 
but there was no argument that the Cronic 1 presumption of prejudice should be applied and 
therefore the presumption may not be considered in this Court, the argument is incorrect for two 
reasons - first, it is inconsistent with the record and second, it is contrary to the law. 
The argument is inconsistent with the record because in Mr. Williams' petition he 
asserted that the "utter abandonment of petitioner's defense by his court appointed attorney" was 
subject to a presumption of prejudice, citing United States v. Swanson, supra, ( a case applying 
the Cronic presumption) and stated: 
Trial counsel abandoned defendant's only defense which was inherently 
prejudicial where counsel conceded [the] only factual issues ... deprived 
petitioner effective assistance of counsel and due process, thus no showing of 
prejudice was necessary. 
R Vol. I, p. 27-28. 
The argument is also incorrect because it is inconsistent with the law. The claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel was clearly before the district court and decided by the district 
court. Even if Mr. Williams had not asserted that he was entitled to a presumption of prejudice 
and cited Swanson in support of that assertion, the case law holds that the appellate court has 
discretion to consider the context of the proceedings in the district court and to consider grounds 
for an objection or claim in that court that are apparent but not explicitly stated by counsel. State 
v. Alamaraz, Idaho P.3d _, 2012 WL 1948499 (2012), holding that some 
discretion lies with the court to consider an objection in light of the context in which it was 
1 United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 646 (1988). 
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presented. See also, State v. Wright,_ Idaho_,_ P.3d _, 2012 WL 2308173 (Ct. App. 
2012), stating that an objection is preserved for appellate review, without resorting to 
fundamental error analysis, if either the specific ground for the objection is clearly stated or the 
basis of the objection is apparent from the context. In Mr. Williams' case, this Court has the 
discretion to consider whether defense counsel's abandonment of self-defense was presumptively 
prejudicial. 
In his objection to the state's motion for summary disposition, Mr. Williams made a long 
argument regarding prejudice and although he did not cite Cronic he repeatedly argued that 
counsel had abandoned the defense and argued that she had failed to subject all the charges to 
meaningful adversarial testing - the standard described in Cronic. 466 U.S. at 659, 104 S.Ct. at 
2047. Mr. Williams wrote: "How can the jury deliberate on the matter of self-defense if the 
defense counsel doesn't ask them to?" R Vol. II, p. 238. "At no time during the preparation for 
trial did defense counsel advise the Petitioner that it was her intent to solely seek an acquittal of 
first-degree murder and abandon any attempt to have him acquitted of all charges on the grounds 
of self-defense." Id. "Petitioner submits again that as defense counsel did not actively seek an 
acquittal of all charges on the grounds of self-defense, his defense was prejudiced. The jury was 
not asked by defense counsel to acquit him on these grounds." R Vol. II, p. 239. "His defense 
was prejudiced in that it was never presented or argued." Id. 
The basis of the Cronic claim is clear from the record and it may be considered on appeal. 
Almaraz, supra; Wright, supra. 
The state also argues that even if abandonment of self-defense is tantamount to a 
concession of guilt, the claim that counsel did not pursue a self-defense theory is affirmatively 
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disproved by the record. Respondent's Brief at pages 10-15. In making this argument, the state 
notes the district court stated that counsel did not present a self-defense theory, but argues that 
the standard ofreview on appeal is one of free review. Respondent's Brief at page 11, ftnt. 2. 
The state cites Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 (1992), for 
the appropriate standard of review - which the state identifies as free review. The standard set 
out in Matthews is: 
Id. 
Similar to the procedure on a summary judgment motion, all facts and reasonable 
inferences properly drawn from those facts must be construed in favor of the 
application when considering an I.C. § 19-4906(b) dismissal. Parrott v. State, 
117 Idaho 272, 274, 787 P.2d 258, 260 (1990). Until allegations in a post-
conviction petition are controverted they are deemed to be true. Clark v. State, 92 
Idaho 827, 830, 452 P.2d 54, 57 (1969). The issue on appeal from a dismissal is 
whether the petition alleges facts which, if true, would entitle the petitioner to 
relief. Smith v. State, 94 Idaho 469,472,491 P.2d 733, 735 (1971). 
See also, Raudebaugh v. State, 135 Idaho 602,604, 21 P.3d 924, 926 (2001), noting that 
the appellate court is to review the facts in a light most favorable to the petitioner and determine 
whether the facts would entitle petitioner to relief if accepted as true. 
There is a difference between this standard of review and free review. 
Applying the Matthews standard ofreview to this case, Mr. Williams alleged facts which, 
if true - specifically that counsel failed to present self-defense - entitle him to relief. 
The state uses the standard of free review of the record to argue that the record does not, 
despite what the district court determined, support the allegation by Mr. Williams, that counsel 
abandoned self-defense. As this is not the standard of review, this argument must fail. 
But, even if this was the standard of review, the argument would still fail because even 
under some sort of free review, the record supports the district court's determination that counsel 
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abandoned self-defense.2 The state argues that defense counsel "spent the majority of her 
opening statement setting the scene for Williams' self-defense theory." Respondent's Brief at 
page 11-12. The opening statement was brief and for the court's convenience is set out in full 
here. 
Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. On behalf of the defendant, I'd like to 
express our thanks for your service here today. I know it's a, it's a trial to be on a 
trial; and it's an important responsibility. And we want you to know that we 
appreciate the time that you're going to spend. 
This is an extremely serious case. I'm not going to kid you. But it's not a very 
complicated case. Mr. Andrew has outlined for you what his side of the story is, 
and now you're going to hear the rest of the story. 
Early morning hours of February 26, Mr. Williams and his brother left the Bali-
Hai bar. Mike Williams got to his car long before the finger-chucking incident 
between his brother and the three Hispanic individuals. Mike knows nothing 
about that. 
Chris Adams was in a good mood all right. He was extremely intoxicated. He 
comes out of the bar and manages to get himself agitated because Mr. Sanchez, 
Mr. Ramirez, and Mr. Martinez get him all upset about so-and-so throwing the 
finger at them; and they're going to go kick some ass. And they're going to tell 
you that on the stand. That was their intention in confronting the Williamses, to 
go kick their ass. 
Again, all this unbeknownst to Mr. Mike Williams who's sitting in his truck 
waiting to leave the area. 
Chris Adams comes around a pickup parked on the other side, about 17 feet away 
2 The state does not explain why free review is to be applied instead of the restrained 
standard of clear error customarily applied to factual issues. Under clear error review, a factual 
finding will not be deemed clearly erroneous unless, after reviewing the record, the appellate 
court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. State v. Bird, 119 
Idaho 196,198,804 P.2d 925,927 (Ct. App. 1990), citing State v. Curtis, 106 Idaho 483,490, 
680 P.2d 1383, 1390 (Ct. App. 1984), citing United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 
U.S. 364, 395 68 S.Ct. , 541 (1948). See also, Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 56, 106 P.3d 
376,382 (2004), holding that on.appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, factual findings 
will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. 
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from where Mr. Williams is sitting in his vehicle; slams down a beer bottle; and 
says, "Fuck this"; walks towards my client; and says, 'Tm going to fucking kill 
you." 
The first my client hears anything of that is the beer bottle breaking. He looks 
over and sees an extremely intoxicated, very agitated man coming towards him. 
At which point he reaches for his gun in the console of his vehicle, has to open it 
up, get the gun out, put it in this crook of his arm - he never did ever say he put it 
there (indicating) put it in the crook of his arm for the purpose of deterring Mr. 
Adams from coming any further and carrying out that threat. 
By the time he gets that gun around, Mr. Adams is within the wingspan of that 
car. He can't close the door. He can't leave. His brother's not in the car. Mr. 
Adams is so close at one point in time he grabs Mr. Williams and scratches his 
neck. 
Now, Mr. Williams is going to testify. I'm not going to, I'm not going to kid you 
about that. He doesn't have to, but he's going to testify about what happened. 
The whole thing was very fast. He did shoot him three times. We're not going to 
deny that. And as a result of those gunshot wounds, Mr. Adams expired. But it's 
a little different scenario than what the State's pointed to you. 
One of the things that you have to determine, because the charge is first-degree 
murder, you have to determine if the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt the 
killing was willful, deliberate, premeditated, and intentional. 
I think, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, by the time you hear the evidence, you 
will find that the State has not met its burden with regard to first-degree murder. 
Trial Tr. p. 90, ln. 23 - p. 93, In. 14. 
The state argues that this opening statement belies the claim that counsel abandoned self-
defense. However, even if the statement looks to attorneys to be laying the groundwork for self-
defense, in the end, counsel undermines all of that by stating to the jury that the question in the 
case is whether the state has carried the burden of proof with regard to first degree murder. 
Counsel does not state that the question before the jury is whether the state has carried the burden 
on all possible charges because the evidence will show that Mr. Williams acted in self-defense 
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and does not even imply that the jury might totally acquit Mr. Williams. Counsel does not 
mention self-defense and does not tell the jury that the question before the jury is whether the 
state ean prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Williams did not act in self-defense. Rather 
than belying the claim that counsel abandoned self-defense, the opening statement supports the 
claim. 
The state next argues that defense counsel's cross-examination of various state's 
witnesses demonstrates that she was pursuing self-defense and seeking a complete acquittal. 
Respondent's Brief at pages l 2-13. 
The state first cites this Court to the cross-examination of Roy Ramirez wherein he 
testified that he did not like the finger-throwing incident and told his friends about it and that this 
made Mr. Adams agitated and angry. Respondent's Brief at page 12, citing Trial Tr. p. 116, In. 
18 - p. 118, ln. 11. However, it is unclear how evidence that Roy Ramirez did not like the finger-
throwing incident and told his friends about it would support a theory of self-defense. The fact 
that people were agitated and angry goes to support a theory of not guilty of first degree murder 
because premeditation was not proven. It does not obviously go to demonstrate self-defense. 
Much more besides general agitation and anger on the part of the alleged victim is required for 
self-defense. In fact, general upset and anger are not even required for self-defense. ICJI 1517. 
Instead of being relevant and/or necessary to self-defense, agitation and anger are more relevant 
to the distinction between murder and manslaughter - the lack of malice aforethought. LC. § 18-
4006. 
The state next points to the cross-examination of Ramon Sanchez, wherein counsel 
elicited testimony that Chris Adams was angry and threw down his beer bottle and walked 
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toward Mr. Williams. Respondent's Brief at page l citing Trial Tr. p. 136, ln. 10 - p. 137, ln. 
22. But, again, anger is not required for self-defense and rather goes more to showing lack of 
malice than self-defense. ICJI 1517, LC.§ 18-4006. 
The state also notes that defense counsel elicited from Officer Bench a concession that 
Mr. Williams told him that he felt threatened. Respondent's Brief at page 12-13, citing Trial Tr. 
p. 201, ln. 7 - p. 202, ln. 2. However, Officer Bench actually testified that Mr. Williams did not 
feel "physically threatened" by Mr. Adams and that he just felt "a little frightened" because he 
heard someone make a reference to getting a gun. Tr. p. 201, ln. 7 - p. 202, ln.2 
And, while the state is correct that counsel did put on Mr. Williams' testimony that he felt 
threatened by Mr. Adams, Respondent's Brief at page 13, citing Trial Tr. p. 220, ln. 1 - p. 238, 
ln. 13; p. 241, ln. 11-23, counsel did not follow through on that evidence by arguing to the jury 
that they should acquit Mr. Williams of all charges based upon the theory of self defense. See 
Trial Tr. p. 280, In. 3 - p. 283, In. 
Rather, counsel argued that this was not a murder case. She did not set out all the 
requirements for self-defense. In fact, she did not even mention the fourth requirement of self-
defense that the defendant acted only in response to the danger and not for some other motivation 
nor offer the jury any reason to find that this requirement was fulfilled and did not offer any 
evidence or argument to support that requirement. LC. § 18-4010. Trial Tr. p. 280, ln. 3 - p. 
283, ln. 23. 
Contrary to the state's arguments, the district court's determination that defense counsel 
abandoned the theory of self-defense is supported by the record. And, of course, all that is 
required is that there are allegations in the petition that if true would entitle the petitioner to 
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relief. Matthews, supra. Mr. Williams has made the necessary allegations, those allegations are 
at the very least not contradicted by the record and indeed are supported by the record, and 
therefore the summary dismissal of the claim was inappropriate. Id. 
B. Mr. Williams did Present a Genuine Issue of Material Fact as to Whether 
Counsel's Performance was Deficient and Prejudicial Under Strickland 
Mr. Williams has argued in the alternative that even if the Cronic presumption of 
prejudice does not apply, he nonetheless raised a genuine issue of material fact as to prejudice 
under Strickland 3 and therefore summary dismissal was inappropriate. Appellant's Opening 
Brief at pages 16-24. 
The state has responded that Mr. Williams did not raise a genuine issue of material fact 
because part of the information he cites in support of the finding of a genuine issue was not 
alleged in Mr. Williams' petition or addressed by the district court and the remaining support 
amounts to "nothing more than a series of examples of how, in hindsight," the case could have 
been tried better. Respondent's Brief at pages 15-16. 
The state's argument confuses the claim of prejudice with the evidence supporting the 
claim. The claim of prejudice was before the district court. At page 26 of his petition, Mr. 
Williams raised ineffective assistance of counsel in not presenting self-defense and wrote that if 
counsel had presented self-defense "petitioner would have been acquitted of all charges against 
him." R Vol. I, p. 33. This is a averment of prejudice. 
And, as noted above, Mr. Williams continued to argue prejudice to the district court. For 
example he wrote in a responsive brief: "It can be seen in no other light that the defense was 
3 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). 
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prejudiced as his defense was never presented.'' R Vol. II, p. 303. 
The claim of prejudice was before the district court. 
Moreover, the evidence and arguments in support of the claim of prejudice were also 
before the district court. In Petitioner's Objection to Motion for Summary Disposition, R Vol. II, 
p. 206-241, Mr. Williams points to the evidence and makes the arguments made in his Opening 
Brief before this Court. 
The state's specific complaints are that arguments and information about trial counsel's 
failure to impeach and/or move for a mistrial with regard to Officer Bench's testimony, counsel's 
failure to call Doug Williams as a witness, and counsel's failure to offer evidence of Mr. Adams' 
history of and reputation for violence were not before the district court. Respondent's Brief at 
pages 15-16. 
In his objection to the motion for summary disposition, in the section arguing that counsel 
was ineffective in failing to present and argue self-defense, Mr. Williams did argue that counsel 
should have objected immediately at the time Officer Bench testified. R Vol. II, p. 23 5. And, he 
argued that "during trial, it is disclosed by Bench that discovery has either been altered or 
tampered with, rendering it incomplete and possibly inaccurate." R Vol. II, p. 238. And, the 
record on post-conviction included both Officer Bench's trial testimony and the transcript of his 
interview with Mr. Williams. On appeal, Mr. Williams did expand the argument, to point out to 
this Court how Officer Bench's testimony was at odds with the actual transcript of the interview.4 
4 In his Opening Brief, Mr. Williams cited this Court to State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 
76,253 P.3d 727, 750 (2011), in arguing that had counsel not abandoned self-defense, she could 
have objected to prosecutorial misconduct in the presentation of Officer Bench's testimony. 
Appellant's Opening Brief at pages 22-23. See also, United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103, 96 
S.Ct. 2394, 2397 (1976). Ellington was not cited and could not have been cited in Mr. Williams' 
I I 
Regarding the failure to call Doug Williams as a witness, Mr. Williams specifically raised 
this and argued it in his petition and again later in his objection to the motion for summary 
judgment. In his petition, Mr. Williams extensively set out his claim that counsel was ineffective 
in failing to call his brother to testify. R Vol. I, p. 26-27. He also offered an affidavit from his 
brother as to what his brother would have testified to had he been called to testify. R Vol. II, p. 
326-327. And, in his objection to the motion for summary disposition, he wrote, "Calling the 
Petitioner's brother to the stand to testify, an eyewitness, to corroborate Petitioner's 
characterization of Chris' aggressive and threatening attitude and comments was warranted. She 
did not." R Vol. II, p. 235. 
The state also argues that the failure to call Doug Williams to testify was a question of 
strategy and should not be considered in this appeal. Respondent's Brief at pages 18-19. 
However, the decision to not present self-defense and to thereby not contest manslaughter is not a 
strategic choice left to counsel. See Appellant's Opening Brief at pages 11-16. 
Likewise, Mr. Williams specifically argued the failure to offer evidence of Mr. Adams' 
history of and reputation for violence in the district court. In his petition, he stated," ... Adams' 
past criminal history should have been presented to the jury .... This information would have 
shown the jury that Adams had a persistent pattern of practice [ of] ... violence upon other 
people ... " R Vol. I, p. 2 7. However, the state is correct that Mr. Williams did not present 
evidence other than his own statements regarding the criminal history of Mr. Adams. 
The state also argues that the closing argument of the prosecutor did not reference 
arguments in the district court because it was decided after proceedings in the district court were 
completed in this case. R Vol. II, p. 427-430. 
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evidence held inadmissible prior to trial. Respondent's Brief at pages 21-24. 
The record speaks for itself. The state argues that the prosecutor's statements that Mr. 
Williams was waiting for a confrontation where he could shoot someone and hoping that 
someone would mess with him is not a reference to inadmissible testimony from Mr. Williams' 
ex-wife that he had a concealed weapons permit because he was hoping for a confrontation so he 
could shoot someone. Likewise, the state argues that the prosecutor's statements that Mr. 
Williams "had another agenda" and was a "hunter" were not based upon inadmissible testimony 
that he was hoping for a chance to shoot someone. Rather, the state argues, this was simply an 
argument based upon the fact that Mr. Williams testified that he had a concealed weapons permit 
and carried a gun for self-defense. Id However, there is a difference between legally carrying a 
gun for self-defense and "waiting for a confrontation where he could shoot somebody if he got 
the opportunity." Trial Tr. p. 264, ln. 4-7. And, there is a difference between legally carrying a 
gun for self-defense and "hoping that just somebody was going to mess with him." Trial Tr. p. 
266, ln. 10-16. And, there is a difference between legally carrying a gun for self-defense and 
"having another agenda" or being a "hunter" (in reference to other people). Trial Tr. p. 272, ln. 
1-5 and page 286, ln. 14-20. 
Lastly, the state argues that the remainder of the examples of how the abandonment of 
self-defense resulted in prejudice is "nothing more than a series of examples of how, in 
hindsight, Williams believes his case could have been better tried." Respondent's Brief at page 
16. However, this argument of the state's is contrary to Strickland 
Strickland establishes the standard required for a showing of prejudice: the petitioner 
must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the 
13 
result of the proceedings would have been different." 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. In 
order to make this determination, the reviewing court must consider the totality of the evidence -
understanding that some factual findings will have been unaffected by the errors and others that 
have been affected will have been affected in different ways. 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. at 2069. 
It is impossible to discuss how the decision to abandon self-defense affected the outcome 
of the proceedings in this case without addressing and discussing how the decision resulted in 
specific actions and failures to act by trial counsel. For example, the decision to abandon self 
defense likely resulted in the decision to not impeach Officer Bench over his testimony about 
whether Mr. Williams told him that he felt threatened; the decision not to call Doug Williams to 
testify; the decision not to offer evidence of Mr. Adams' history of and reputation for violence; 
the decision not to offer evidence of Mr. Adams' toxicology report; the decision to not offer 
evidence of Mr. Adams' statements earlier in the evening that he would take care of Mr. 
Williams; the decision not to offer the evidence regarding whether the truck had been tampered 
with. These matters are not just a list of examples of how the case could have been better tried. 
Rather, they are examples of how the decision to abandon self-defense resulted in prejudice. It is 
only by considering these matters that a reviewing court can determine if Mr. Williams raised a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether counsel's decision to abandon self defense was 
prejudicial. 
When the evidence that was not presented is considered in totality with the evidence that 
was presented, Mr. Williams has raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was 
prejudiced by counsel's abandonment of self-defense. Strickland, supra. See Milburn v. State, 
130 Idaho 649, 659, 946 P.2d 71, 81 (Ct. App. 1997), stating that in an appeal from the summary 
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disposition of a petition for post-conviction relief claiming ineffective assistance of counsel it is 
not the appellate court's job to determine what a jury would have found nor to make its own 
assessment of the petitioner's guilt or innocence, but rather, it is to determine whether the 
petitioner has made a prima facie showing that the result of his trial is unreliable. This Mr. 
Williams has done by showing all the evidence that could have been presented and actions that 
could have been taken to stop the state from carrying its burden at trial to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that he did not act in self-defense. State v. Jones, 146 Idaho 297,298, 193 P.3d 
457,458 (Ct. App. 2008); IC.JI 1517. 
C. Summary Dismissal was Inappropriate Because the District Court Failed to 
Analvze Whether Counsel's Actions Resulted in a Denial of Fundamental 
Constitutional Rights Which Could not be Waived Without Mr. Williams' 
Consent 
Mr. Williams' Opening Brief addresses why the district court erred in summarily 
dismissing his petition without considering whether he was denied the fundamental constitutional 
rights to jury trial, to hold the government to its burden of proof, and the right to present 
evidence in his own defense. united States Const. Amends. 5, 6, and 14; Idaho Const. Art. I, §§ 
7 and 13. Appellant's Opening Brief at pages 24-26. 
The state has argued that there was no error. Respondent's Brief at pages 24-25. 
Mr. Williams will rely upon the argument set out in his Opening Brief. It is of note, 
however, that to accept the state's interpretation of DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 200 P.3d 
1148 (2009) and Barcella v. State, 148 Idaho 469,224 P.3d 536 (Ct. App. 2009), this Court must 
overlook the distinction between DeRushe and Barcella specifically discussed in Barcella - to 
wit, DeRushe, like this case, was decided upon a motion for summary dismissal, while in 
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Barcella, the case was decided after an evidentiary hearing. Barcella, 148 Idaho at 475, 224 P.3d 
at 542. 
Ill CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in the Opening Brief and above, Mr. Williams asks that the order 
summarily dismissing his claim that counsel was ineffective in abandoning the theory of self-
defense be vacated and that this Court either grant summary relief in his favor under a 
presumption of prejudice standard or remand for further proceedings in the district court. 
Respectfully submitted this 1!! day of July, 2012. 
~t)J_ ~/( 
Deborah Whipp~p¼ 
Attorney for Michael Williams 
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